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Flood vulnerability is an internationally important problem with no easy solution.  In this paper it 
is argued that vulnerability is an emergent output of interacting human and engineering 
components, and that to make further progress on usefully deploying the concept, a systems 
approach is needed.  The existing state of the art in Flood Vulnerability Indices is blended with a 
constraints-based systems engineering approach called an Abstraction Hierarchy.  Four existing 
towns were modelled using this approach, and the impact of a 1-200 year flood was assessed, by 
focusing on the key interactions within the model.  As the flood waters progressively removed 
physical objects in the system, higher level processes and functions became systematically degraded.  
Via this process, the modelled towns were revealed to be low on exposure, high on susceptibility, 
but low on resilience.  This is one of eight vulnerability types possible.  Different flood risk solutions 
can be associated with different vulnerability types.  Comparing these outputs to real life policy and 
practice reveals some interesting areas of mismatch. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A nation’s critical infrastructure needs to be able to withstand disturbances as they happen, then 
bounce back afterwards.  Most nations have the equivalent of a National Risk Register (e.g. Cabinet 
Office, 2013).  In the UK it presents a range of civil emergencies with a greater than 1 in 20 chance of 
occurring in the next five years, and with the potential to yield impacts ranging from social 
disruption and economic harm through to widespread illness and fatalities.  Flooding is a prime 
example (p. 10).  The ability of daily life to continue in the face of disturbances like this does not 
depend on a single engineering solution; rather on the ability of organisations, infrastructure and 
individuals to anticipate the changing shape of risk before failures and harm occur, then to respond 
in effective ways when it does.  This paper puts the latest research on flood vulnerability in touch 
with a novel systems method, enabling this wider view to be captured explicitly.  Several real towns 
were modelled and subject to a simulated 1 in 200 year flood event.  The method shows how critical 
functions and processes at higher levels of system abstraction are progressively degraded as 
individual ‘physical objects’, at low levels of abstraction, are flooded.  In addition, metrics are 
extracted from the model to enable each town to be characterised in terms of its vulnerability, and 
positioned in a universal ‘vulnerability space’.  Solutions for improving resilience vary depending on 
what region of the space is occupied, and the method can be deployed to determine this for any 
town in any region of the world.  First, the concept of vulnerability is defined, the role of systems 
thinking explained, and the specific method to be employed (and extended) presented.   
Defining Vulnerability 
The concept of vulnerability is often used within natural hazard, disaster and environmental 
change research.  Many authors have discussed and attempted to define this concept (e.g. Adger, 
2006; Lewis, 1999; Van der Veen and Logtmeijer, 2005).  The IPCC definition (McCarthy, 2001) states 
that vulnerability is: the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse 
climate change effects.  A comprehensive discussion on vulnerability can be found in Balica et al. 
(2009) and Balica and Wright (2010), and its importance is difficult to overstate:  according to some 
authors ‘vulnerability is the root cause of disasters’ (Lewis, 1999).  This paper focuses on the issue of 
vulnerability to the natural hazard of flooding, and within this context a functional definition of 
vulnerability is required.   
There have been numerous attempts to define flood vulnerability (e.g. Kazmeirczak and Cavan, 
2011; Giupponi et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013; Balica et al., 2013).  Common to them all is the division of 
vulnerability into certain component parts.  There is some consensus about what these parts should 
be, with vulnerability incorporating concepts of susceptibility, exposure and resilience.  Exposure can 
be considered the tangible and intangible goods and services, possessing value of some kind, which 
may be subject to flooding.  Susceptibility is the extent to which such elements are exposed, which 
in turn influences the chance of being harmed at times of hazardous floods (Balica et al., 2009).  
Resilience relates to adaptive capacity and so-called ‘bounce back’ (Adger, 2006). Balica et al., (2009, 
2013) define flood vulnerability as:  
“the extent to which a system is susceptible to floods due to exposure, a perturbation, in 
conjunction with its ability (or inability) to cope, recover, or basically adapt” (Balica et al, 2009, p. 
2572).   
According to this definition, vulnerability can be imagined as a three dimensional space with 
exposure, susceptibility and resilience forming the main axes (Figure 1).  A town (or any other 
system under analysis) will fall into a particular region of the three dimensional space depending on 
the components which define the type of flood vulnerability.  For example, a region may have high 
exposure combined with a population at risk (i.e. a city such as Rotterdam in the Netherlands or Ho 
Chi Minh City, Vietnam), leading to high susceptibility.  A geographical area that has high exposure 
but is predominantly uninhabited, such as agricultural land prone to flooding (e.g. areas along the 
Mekong river used for rice production during the wet season), could be said to have low 
susceptibility and high resilience.  The key issue is that the interventions required are likely to differ 
across vulnerability types.  Using the three dimensional vulnerability space, vulnerability ‘solutions’ 
can be scrutinized for their match to vulnerability ‘type’.  For example, high resilience in a population 
can be encouraged through flood proofing of structures and businesses, education, and robust flood 
warnings.  Exposure can be reduced using hard engineering interventions such as flood defences or 
reservoir storage in the upper catchment.  Susceptibility can be addressed via planning restrictions 
and other means that reduce the chance of damage and destruction due to flooding.    The possible 
engineering solutions are, to some extent, plentiful.  This reflects the typical focus of flood risk 
management.  The conceptual challenge is to define what type of vulnerability a location possesses, 
and to respond with optimum (not necessarily engineering), solutions. 
Figure 1 – The three dimensions of vulnerability intersect to create a coordinate space, or cube, into which specific 
sites would fall 
 
Traditional and Parametric Approaches to Modelling Flood Vulnerability 
Floods are primarily the result of extreme weather events.  The magnitude of extreme events 
has an inverse relationship with the frequency of their occurrence, so floods with high magnitude 
tend to occur less frequently than more moderate events.  The relationship between the frequency 
of occurrence and its magnitude is traditionally established by performing a frequency analysis of 
historical hydrological data using different probability distributions.  Once the frequency, magnitude, 
and shape of the hydrograph are established, computer models which discretise the topographical 
river and land form are used to estimate flood depth, flood elevation and velocity (Hartano et al., 
2011). The results from a computer model can then be used for loss estimation due to a particular 
design flood event.  Loss estimation, however, does not cover the full remit of vulnerability.  As a 
result, vulnerability estimation using more traditional approaches is difficult and open to 
interpretation (Balica et al, 2013).   
To overcome these challenges a more recent innovation has been the development of 
parametric approaches that attempt to quantify flood vulnerability.  An example of this is the Flood 
Vulnerability Index (FVI) method as developed by Balica et al. (2009).  This is an indicator-based 
methodology that aims to identify hotspots related to flood events in data rich and/or data scarce 
areas around the world.  The main concept consists of determining the spatial scale of the analysis 
(e.g. river basin through to urban area), then assessing the place on a battery of individual indicators 
in order to arrive at four high level characteristics (social, economic, environmental and physical).  
From this, actions to diminish focal spots of flood vulnerability can be identified and action plans to 
deal with floods and flooding put in place (for a full account see Balica et al., 2009).  Methods such as 
these have an important role to play, and while they attempt to capture the softer and more difficult 
to define aspects of vulnerability, they still rely on an ostensibly deterministic logic.  In other words, 
the focal spots of flood vulnerability are decomposed into elements that are counted or otherwise 
analysed separately.  The FVI approach is taxonomic – which has many practical advantages – but in 
complex sociotechnical systems like the catchments and settlements that form the subject of flood 
risk analyses, there are opportunities to go further.   
 
Systems Approach  
There is an argument to say that vulnerability arises from the interaction of human and 
engineering components within a system, be it an entire catchment or an individual town.  In effect, 
what we are measuring with traditional and parametric approaches to flood vulnerability are the 
collective effects of these interactions.  Vulnerability, then, is an emergent property: a phenomenon 
wherein “complex, interesting high-level function is produced as a result of combining simple low-
level mechanisms in simple ways” (Chalmers, 1990, p.2).  Emergence presents a problem for the 
modelling of flood vulnerability because “as systems become more complex […], self-organisation 
appears at more than one level […].  Such systems have multiple, hierarchical levels of self-
organisation, and calculation of system level emergent properties from the component level rapidly 
becomes intractable” (Halley and Winkler, 2008, p. 12).  In other words, the output being sought (i.e. 
a measure of ‘vulnerability’) is not easy to achieve based on an understanding of components of the 
system in isolation.   
An alternative approach is to create a functional structure of the system in question and the 
possibilities and constraints within it which shape behaviour (Naikar, 2013).  The analogy often given 
is the ‘ant on a beach’ (Simon, 1981).  Looked at in isolation, the trajectory of the ant looks un-
patterned and random.  Only when the environment (and the physical constraints) are overlaid does 
the trajectory make sense.  This is the essence of the constraints-based approach being deployed in 
this paper.  There is, however, a broader interpretation of constraints in that they are not merely 
physical constraints restricting movement through a landscape, but behavioural constraints 
influenced by a myriad of features, ranging from rules and procedures through to social and cultural 
norms.  Systems thinking enables the full diversity of these constraint types to be included in the 
model of the system in question, whether it Is an individual town or an entire catchment.  It also 
confers a number of other, more specific, advantages.  Most notable for present purposes is that the 
model is ‘event independent’.  It “provides a basis for reasoning about any situation, including those 




The concept of vulnerability will be explored by applying a systems-based method to four towns.  
The purpose of the study is to derive measures of susceptibility, resilience and exposure and in doing 
so explore some wider research questions.  Firstly, is it possible to discern specific vulnerability 
pathways, or areas where a settlement is more or less likely to be critically affected should a flood 





The systems method is called an Abstraction Hierarchy (AH).  Abstraction refers to “qualities of 
objects, events, phenomena etc. which are considered separate or apart from the objects, events or 
phenomena themselves” (Reber, 1995, p. 3).  Thus a chair, for example, describes a general class of 
object somewhat abstracted upwards from the specific chair that one is sitting on at this moment.  
Likewise, the end product ‘respond to a flood’ is even more abstracted from the emergency 
responses and myriad other interventions that comprise a flood response.  In either case, a form of 
hierarchy is implied in that ‘concrete’ physical entities will tend to reside at the bottom, contributing 
to progressively higher levels of ‘intangible’ abstraction higher up.  Rasmussen (1986) and colleagues 
have developed a particular form of AH that relates well to the combined human and technical 
interventions involved in flood events, one that can be applied to systems of any size or type, as 
shown in Table 1: 
Table 1 - Five levels of abstraction that can be applied to any system (Naikar et al., 2005)  
There are many ways different levels of abstraction that can be derived.  In this case, the five 
levels are based on studies by Rasmussen and colleagues into decision-making, and how humans 
think and reason about complex systems (Rasmussen, 1974: 1986).  It was discovered that people 
reason about ‘concrete’ physical information (i.e. “how does this work”) and ‘intangible’ higher level 
functional abstractions (i.e. “why is this here?” Jenkins, et al., 2009; Rasmussen, 1986) and this is 
what the links between levels of abstraction represent; the ‘how’ and ‘why’, or the ‘means’ that a 
system can use in order to achieve defined ‘ends’.  From a systems point of view, linkages between 
levels of abstraction are as important as the entities themselves, and this is captured in Rasmussen’s 
AH through the use of ‘means ends links’ within a hierarchy, as shown in Figure 2.   
Figure 2 – The generic form of Rasmussen’s Abstraction Hierarchy has five levels of abstraction, with objects, 
activities, effects, outcomes and end state(s) joined by means-ends relationships (Jenkins et al., 2009).  The example 
shown is that for a domestic central heating system. 
 
Figure 2 presents the example of a domestic central heating system.  While most people will be 
familiar with the ‘physical objects’ this system is comprised of; the radiators, hot water cylinder, 
thermostat etc., many will not think and reason about the system in terms of how these contribute 
to higher level functions.  Indeed, what these higher-level functions actually are.  The radiator, for 
example, serves the obvious function of radiating heat, but it also contributes to the transport of the 
coolant around the system, responding to pressure changes in the system (via associated pressure 
relief valves), and the control of radiated heat via the valves or radiator thermostats.  These in turn 
contribute to higher level generalised functions such as ‘heating domestic spaces’, success in which 
can be assessed by the extent to which it contributes to values and priority measures like ‘supply of 
radiated heat’ but also other measures such as ‘ease of installation’ and ‘ease of use’.  All of these, in 
turn, contribute to the reason why the system exists in the first place, which is, among other things 
(such as system safety, cost and efficiency), to simply “match ambient temperature to lifestyle”.  
Working from the bottom of the hierarchy upwards in this way enables the system to be thought 
about in terms of ‘what’ objects and functions exist, ‘how’ they support higher-level functions, and 
‘why’ they do so.  It is also possible to work from the other direction because the links are bi-
directional.  Instead of asking what-how-why, one instead asks why-how-what:  why the system 
exists, how it functions, and what supports those functions, or indeed, what could support those 
functions.  After all, the functional purpose of a central heating system could be met by a gas fired 
boiler supplying heat to water which is then pumped around a circuit containing radiators, or it could 
be provided by heating air and pumping this into the living spaces, or indeed some other form of 
technology not yet devised.   
Rasmussen’s AH enables any civil engineering system to be represented at any level of 
granularity (Stanton et al., 2006).  As a method for exploring such systems it becomes possible to 
insert (or remove) concrete physical objects from the bottom of the hierarchy, and to analyse the 
effect in terms of higher-level intangible activities, effects, outcomes and end states.  The approach 
is flexible.  It becomes possible to analyse how changes at the bottom of the analysis, however small, 
might propagate up through the system to become magnified (or attenuated) at higher levels of 
abstraction.  The means-ends links in the AH are an expression of all the ‘affordances’ in the system, 
or the ‘possibilities for action’.  Some of these will be readily apparent, while others will be emergent 
properties.  Using the AH representation these possibilities for action become visually manifest and 
can be explored.  This is a particularly relevant question when civil engineering systems (such as 
towns) are subject to disturbances (such as flooding).   
Procedure 
Step 1 – Four candidate towns in Scotland were selected: Dumbarton, Dumfries, Stranraer and 
Moffat.  Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) flood maps were accessed for each area, 
showing the flood extent for a 1 in 200 year fluvial flood event. 
Step 2 – Classes of ‘physical object’ that fell within the borders of the indicated flood fluvial 
extent were extracted.  These included objects such as private housing, shops, infrastructure (e.g. 
roads, gas holders, bridges etc.), industrial units, factories and so on.  These represented the 
‘physical objects’ affected by the ingress of a flood and the bottom level of the Abstraction 
Hierarchy.   
Step 3 – The top level of the AH describes the system’s ‘Functional Purpose’ or the systems’ 
fundamental ‘reason(s) for being’.  In this case the Functional Purpose of a town was defined as: 
1. Meet housing/accommodation/shelter needs 
2. Support economic activity 
3. Provide safety and security 
4. Protect cultural heritage 
5. Support freedom of movement (people and goods) 
6. Provide infrastructure needs (power, water, waste disposal etc.) 
Step 4 – Values and priority measures represent the second layer of the AH.  They describe 
criteria that can be used to measure progress towards the Functional Purposes. Indicators used in 
the established parametric method (Flood Vulnerability Index; Balica et al. 2009) were used to 
populate this layer and linked to the achievement of Functional Purposes at the layer above. The 
rationale here is to use an established method for flood vulnerability assessment and embed it in the 
systems method.   
Step 5 – Object Related Processes describe the capabilities and limitations of the physical objects 
in the system.  They represent the next level of abstraction, showing the specific ‘functions’ to which 
physical objects (or groups of objects) contribute. Likewise, the middle layer in the AH analysis, 
Purpose Related Functions, raises the level of functional abstraction further still by defining the 
‘generic functions’ that a town performs, as supported by Object Related Processes (in the layer 
below) and measurable by the FVI’s (in the layer above). 
Step 6 – Once the ‘nodes’ in the AH were inserted, the ‘means-ends’ links between levels were 
established.  In this analysis the links represent the means-ends relations “that are evident in a 
particular situation or set of situations” (Naikar, 2014, p. 105), specifically, those likely to be in place 
prior to and at the onset of a flood.  These were established by asking three independent analysts to 
complete the means-ends linking task according to strict ‘linking criteria’.  Any node in the 
Abstraction Hierarchy can be taken to answer the question of ‘what’ it does.  The node is then linked 
to all of the nodes in the level directly above to answer the question of ‘why’ it is needed.  It is then 
linked to all of the nodes in the level directly below to answer the question ‘how’ this can be 
achieved.  For each town, an inter-rater reliability analysis was performed using Cohen’s Kappa to 
determine consistency between observers. The kappa values for Dumbarton (κ = .64, p < .0001),  
Dumfries (κ = .753, p < .0001), Moffat (κ = .651, p < .0001), and Stranraer (κ = .658, p < .0001) 
indicate that for all four towns, inter-rater agreement was “substantial” (Landis and Koch, 1977). 
Step 7 – The completed Abstraction Hierarchies were then subject to a numerical analysis based 
on Graph Theory.  The constraints represented at each layer became nodes, and the means/ends 
relations became links.  By these means the visual complexity of the raw AH diagrams was reduced 
into a tractable set of metrics which have underlying construct validity in relation to the vulnerability 
of the ‘system’ (i.e. the town in question).  These metrics are described in full in the results.  To 
anchor the results a baseline condition was created by ‘fully connecting’ an AH.  This sets the upper 
limit for the various metrics that will be applied and allows comparisons to be made against an 
objective baseline. 
Figure 3 – High level overview of the Abstraction Hierarchy (AH) for the town of Dumbarton showing the size and 
extent of the full analysis.  This high level complexity is reduced by applying techniques from Graph Theory, which use 
the complex web of interconnections to define specific critical objects as shown in closer detail within Tables 2, 3 and 4.   
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Critical Flood Risk Nodes and their Interactions 
The Abstraction Hierarchy can be used to identify which nodes, and at what level of abstraction, 
are more or less critical when subject to a flood induced disturbance.  Criticality refers in this case 
not to a value judgement concerning the node’s physical role in a town, but to its functional role 
within a network in terms of affording or constraining behaviours within it.  These might be 
‘common sense’ nodes that arise from an intuitive understanding based on simple cause and effect 
logic (e.g. a gas holder sounds important and, for Dumbarton, is important), or they may also be 
‘emergent’ properties arising from the complex systemic nature of the system (e.g. leisure facilities 
do not sound important but in Dumfries they were).  The technique used to identify critical nodes 
within the Abstraction Hierarchies is to apply a graph theory metric called Sociometric Status, which 
is given by the formula: 












where g is the total number of nodes in the network, i and j are individual nodes, and χij are the 
number of links present between node i and j (Houghton et al., 2006).  Network metrics of this kind 
are numerous (e.g. Monge & Contractor, 2003) and future work is aimed at exploring the construct 
validity of further variants.  Sociometric status, however, serves as a valid starting point in that a) it 
provides an indication of the positional centrality of the node in the wider network, in particular, its 
ability to influence other nodes.  Also b) it is compatible with the bi-directional nature of the means-
ends links.  Table 2 summarises the results obtained by applying this network metric to the AH 
analyses.   
Table 2 – Top three nodes at each level of the Abstraction Hierarchy.  The sociometric status values are expressed 
as a percentage of the maximum value (i.e. that derived from a fully connected Abstraction Hierarchy)  
Table 2 identifies the top three critical nodes for each of the four candidate towns at different 
levels of the abstraction hierarchy.  Two key observations can be made.  The first is a wider point 
about how the differences between towns become progressively more ‘damped out’ the higher one 
progresses up the levels of abstraction.  Specifically, the configuration of physical objects, and how 
they are affected by a flood event, cause individual vulnerabilities at the (lower) level of object 
related processes, yet the ability of all towns to meet their highest level functional purposes are 
affected similarly.  To clarify, this does not mean that all towns are identically affected in flood 
extent or damage but that the extent and damage degrades the housing/ accommodation/ shelter 
function to the greatest degree when the system as a whole is considered.  This is certainly 
consistent with recent flood events in the UK and the response hierarchy of responding agencies 
(e.g. Hartwell-Naguib and Roberts, 2014).  Table 3 rank orders all of the higher-level systemic effects 
and also maps them onto the UK Environment Agency’s response hierarchy of ‘people-property-
land’. The systemic insights discovered in this analysis map well on to the existing hierarchy, with the 
emphasis on people, then property, quite clearly manifest.   
Table 3 – Order of criticality/priority of highest level Functional Purposes 
The order of criticality of these functional purposes can be correlated to the type of flood 
damage or impact felt.  The top three critical functional purposes can be categorised as direct 
impacts of floods, while the lower three are representative of indirect impacts (Carrera et al., 2015).  
The observed correlation reflects the severity of the impact, whereby impacts to housing, 
accommodation, safety and security, and freedom of movement are of great importance, and are 
often significantly impacted during and in the immediate aftermath of a flood event.   Indeed, in 
terms of flood response this tends to be the first and immediate response of any government.  This 
can be seen clearly in the case of the 2013/14 floods in the UK, where the Environment Agency 
delivered a hierarchical response to the population (people, property, then agricultural land) 
(Hartwell-Naguib and Roberts, 2014 as shown in Table 3).  In reflecting not just this response 
hierarchy, but also the hierarchy of direct and indirect effects, the AH seems to be exhibiting good 
construct validity.  Further analysis and development of the method to incorporate more complex 
functional purposes may prove interesting.  For example, it may be of interest to test whether 
tangible or intangible impacts are more critical to the network.  Likewise, the current analysis shows 
only the immediate effect of the flood, but future work will examine the temporal aspects.  
Specifically the ability of critical functions to restore themselves to pre-flood levels depending on the 
recovery levels occurring elsewhere in the wider system.   
Whilst the Abstraction Hierarchy performs as a common model applicable across all towns at the 
level of Functional Purposes, at the level of Object Related Processes more localised, functional 
degradation is evident (Table 2).  There is some uniformity, to the extent that individual processes 
appear consistently across all towns (e.g. the provision of housing services), but there are also some 
important differences (e.g. cultural heritage is degraded by a flood in Dumfries to the same extent 
that education is degraded in Moffat).  Again, the list can be read as a form of flood-degradation 
priority/criticality list. This analysis identifies the services particularly vulnerable within a studied 
area, and highlights these in a way which may be overlooked by more traditional methods.  This is 
particularly true if multiple geographical areas are assessed in a consistent manner, which is 
conducive to the approach, as comparisons between results will highlight competing vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerability Profile 
A systemic feature of the results so far is the extent to which changes at lower levels of the AH 
become progressively damped out as they propagate upwards, in line with the critical functions 
degraded in real floods.  A practical outcome of the work is that a vulnerability profile can be 
created, one that relates to a class of Scottish town similar to those modelled in this study.  To do 
this, the Values and Priority measures are used.  These are based on FVI metrics developed by Balica 
et al. (2009) and they belong to three vulnerability classes as shown in Table 4.  Like all nodes in the 
AH the Values and Priority Measures have an associated Sociometric Status value.  It is again 
possible to derive a value based on the percentage difference in Sociometric Status values between 
a fully connected AH (the ‘control’ AH described above) and those relating to real-life locations.  
Because any differences between real-life locations have been damped out at this level of analysis, 
only one set of values need be displayed in Table 4.   
Table 4 – Each FVI / Value and Priority Measure has an associated Sociometric Status Value (shown as a % of the 
maximum value) and belongs to one of three vulnerability categories 
A mean for each category of vulnerability can be derived (as shown in Table 4) which can then 
be used as a coordinate along separate axes described by resilience, susceptibility and exposure.  
The axes intersect to create a ‘vulnerability cube’ and the mean values provide coordinates to fix a 
point in this space (as shown in Figure 4).   
Figure 4 – The coordinate space created by the intersecting resilience, susceptibility and exposure axes can be 
populated with the case study example(s).  The coordinate space is divided into eight ‘octants’, associated with each is a 
distinctive flood response strategy.   
If the coordinate space shown in Figure 4 is divided into eight zones (as shown) it can be seen 
that the modelled towns fall into a distinctive region.  They measure low on exposure but also low 
on resilience and high on susceptibility (Zone 6).  The eight zones create a form of taxonomy, which 
in turn represents the flood risk ‘problem space’ and where a given case study might fall depending 
on the structure and type of the associated AH, as shown in Table 5.  This affords a different 
perspective and insight into the flood vulnerability of Scottish towns and perhaps even vulnerability 
in the UK.  What is interesting is that the towns studied do not have a significant risk associated with 
flood exposure, but that their high susceptibility and low resilience increases their vulnerability.  
Traditional approaches to flood risk management tend to focus on direct impacts and addressing 
exposure issues.  What this research highlights is that susceptibility and resilience may be at least as 
important in the Scottish, and potentially the UK context.  This reflects current thinking in flood risk 
management which promotes a focus towards a more ‘systematic’ user/human orientated 
approach.  Consequently this poses the challenge of identifying interventions that move these towns 
from Zone 6 to Zone 1 (Table 5). 
Table 5 – The vulnerability problem space 
Looking at recent UK events and the subsequent responses in a very general and simplistic way 
we can perhaps identify the impacts of current flood response on the UK.  For example, the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI, 2010; UK Parliament, 2015) reported a significantly lower 
insurance payout (£500M) as a result of the 2013-14 flood events when compared to the 2007 
events (approx. £3B).  This is, in part, due to the impacted population being of a smaller number, and 
in a rural rather than urban location. However, the public perception of the 2013-14 events is that 
they were at least as bad as those experienced in 2007.  Significant capital investment has been 
made in these intervening years, focused primarily on reducing exposure.  This may have had an 
impact on the numbers of those directly affected, although comparison is not possible due to 
differences in type, location and nature of the events experienced.  At a high level this would fit the 
profile identified above of low exposure, but high susceptibility and low resilience.  In other words, 
having tackled the former issues of exposure, the latter issues of susceptibility and resilience seem 
to require greater attention, and this is a feature which emerges from the present analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Flood vulnerability is a key issue, but there are still conceptual and methodological problems if 
the concept is to prove useful in informing policy and practice.  Drawing on existing literature, this 
paper offers a working definition of the term, and relates it to three underlying concepts: 
susceptibility, exposure and resilience.  The current state of the art is to use numerical measures and 
indices to show how catchments and settlements compare and where best to direct resources.  In 
this paper we present an argument to suggest that susceptibility, exposure and resilience are 
emergent outputs of a complex, non-linear sociotechnical system.  To make further progress a more 
systemic method is required in order to understand the critical interactions and what they mean for 
a place’s flood vulnerability.  The approach adopted in this paper is based on constraints and the 
idea that by modelling these constraints we create the ‘behaviour space’ of a place, and can begin to 
make sense not only of the behaviours which do occur, but also those behaviours which ‘could 
occur’ in major flooding episodes.  By looking at the problem from a systems perspective the 
adaptability of the ‘system’ (i.e. the place) can be modelled and quantified to reveal a vulnerability 
profile, and a position within a typological flood risk model defined.  Depending on the region a 
place falls within the typological model also depends the strategy for improving vulnerability in that 
location. 
The model presented here identifies some interesting discrepancies between what we currently 
do to mitigate flood risk and what we potentially should do. The UK has tended towards 
management measures that focus on reducing exposure.  The results of this model suggest that 
addressing urban resilience and susceptibility are at least as important, and this poses the question 
of how best to address them. For example, what interventions are necessary to improve our current 
level of vulnerability, and what can we learn from other international examples (e.g. Bangladesh, 
Vietnam etc) to improve our resilience and lessen our susceptibility?   Using the structured approach 
proposed here, a methodological approach to testing interventions may now be possible. 
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